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Convention and the [Kyoto] 
Protocol; and (ii) reducing 
New Zealand’s net emissions 
of those gases to below 
business-as-usual levels’. 
Beyond this, the New Zealand 
government has confirmed 
three objectives for the ETS:
•	 help	New	Zealand	to	
deliver its ‘fair share’ 
of international action 
to reduce emissions, 
including meeting any 
international obligations; 
•	 deliver	emission	relations	
Introduction
The New Zealand emissions trading scheme (ETS) was 
introduced by legislation in 2008. The legislated objectives as 
stated	in	section	3	of	the	Climate	Change	Response	Act	2002	
are	to	‘support	and	encourage	global	efforts	to	reduce	the	
emission of greenhouse gases by (i) assisting New Zealand 
to meet its international obligations under the [UNFCCC] 
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  in the most cost-effective manner; 
•	 support	efforts	to	maximise	the	long-
term resilience of the New Zealand 
economy at least cost. (New Zealand 
Government, 2012; Ministry for the 
Environment, 2013a) 
Criteria used by the Ministry for the 
Environment to assess the regulatory 
impact	 of	 changes	 to	 the	 ETS	 (shown	
in Table 1) give further insight into a 
possible	interpretation	of	these	objectives.	
Decarbonisation	 is	 part	 of	 long-term	
economic resilience, demonstrated by 
the	 criteria	 to	 ‘provide	 incentives	 for	
the	 long-term	 development	 of	 low-cost	
emission abatement technologies’ and 
to	 ‘minimise	 negative/maximise	 positive	
wider	 environmental	 impacts’	 (Ministry	
for	 the	 Environment,	 2012c,	 p.10).	
Furthermore, a key strategic driver for 
subsequent amendments made in 2012 
was	 to	ensure	 that	 the	ETS	‘supports	 the	
government’s	economic	growth	priorities:	
providing	more	flexibility	and	mitigating	
short term costs for business while 
ensuring	 clear	 long	 term	 price	 signals	
that encourage a smooth transition to 
a low carbon economy’ (New Zealand 
Cabinet,	2012,	p.1).	
The initial design of the New Zealand 
ETS was heralded as a trail-blazing all-
sectors,	 all-gases,	 flexible	 cap-and-trade	
system	 (see,	 for	 example,	 Moyes,	 2008;	
Jiang,	Sharp	and	Sheng,	2009).	However,	
it was also criticised for its reliance on 
offsets (from both forestry and overseas) 
and lack of ambition in terms of gross 
domestic emissions reduction (for further 
criticisms	 see,	 for	 example,	 Bertram	
and Terry, 2010). Since its introduction 
the ETS has also undergone significant 
change, although the main framework of 
the scheme has remained intact. 
Amendments	 introduced	 by	 the	 
National	 government	 in	 2009	 deferred	
the	 imposition	of	 obligations	on	 the	 ag-
riculture sector and introduced intensity-
based allocation for emissions-intensive 
and	trade-exposed	industries.	‘Transition-
al measures’ were also legislated: a ‘two 
for one’ surrender obligation (whereby 
emitters	 in	 all	 sectors	 except	 forestry	 are	
required to surrender only one unit for 
every two tonnes of emissions) and a 
fixed	price	option	(effectively	a	$25	price	
cap	 on	 the	 value	 of	 a	New	Zealand	unit	
(NZU)). The measures were argued by 
the National government as being neces-
sary in the uncertain economic climate 
and	 were	 supported	 by	 many	 industry	
stakeholder	 groups.	 However,	 they	 were	
also criticised for being overly generous 
with allocation, being even less ambi-
tious than the original scheme design, 
and	 putting	 the	 interests	 of	 some	 stake-
holder	groups	above	others	(Hood,	2010;	
Bertram and Terry, 2010; Bullock, 2012; 
Richter and Mundaca, 2014). Transitional 
measures	were	 due	 to	 be	 phased	 out	 af-
ter 2012, but have instead been retained 
indefinitely.
This	article	discusses	the	development	
and	performance	of	the	scheme	since	the	
report	 of	 the	Emissions	Trading	 Scheme	
Review	 Panel	 in	 2011.	 In	 particular,	 the	
article	 presents	 the	 results	 of	 a	 survey	
undertaken	by	 the	authors	 in	April	2013	
of	stakeholders’	perception	of	the	scheme	
and	 its	 performance.	 The	 survey	 was	
designed and administered by the authors 
using FluidSurveys software. 
General questions about the 
scheme’s objectives and future outlook 
were	 asked	 of	 all	 respondents.	 More	
targeted questions regarding market and 
compliance	 behaviour	 were	 asked	 of	
respondents	who	identified	themselves	as	
either	forestry	participants,	emitters	with	
direct obligations, emitters indirectly 
affected by the scheme, carbon traders, 
or	 ‘others’,	 including	 representatives	 of	
non-governmental organisations and 
policy	makers.	The	survey	was	advertised	
through numerous channels, including 
the Carbon Match website. 
The key results of the survey were that 
considerable regulatory uncertainty has 
surrounded the scheme; that stakeholders 
are divided over its future; and that it 
currently	 provides	 no	 incentive	 for	 new	
planting.	 Lastly,	 this	 article	 discusses	 the	
issue of uncertainty in the scheme and 
Table 1: Ministry for the Environment assessment criteria under high-level objectives
High-level
objective
Delivering fair
share
Delivering cost-effective 
emission reductions
Long-term economic resilience
Criteria Facilitate international efforts Minimise short-term negative 
economic impacts
Minimise long-term negative 
economic impacts
Contribute to NZ international 
obligations
Minimise costs to businesses Maintain long-term international 
competitiveness
Enhance NZ’s international 
credibility
Minimise market distortions Provide incentives for the long-
term development of low-cost 
emission abatement technologies
Contribute to achieving NZ’s 
fair share
Minimise risks of trade sanctions Maximise equity between sectors 
and socio-economic groups
Provide incentives to
abate
Minimise government’s
administrative and
implementation costs
Promote intertemporal equity
Contribute to meeting NZ’s 
2050 target
Minimise ETS participants’
compliance and transaction 
costs
Ensure appropriate risk-sharing 
between emitters and government
Promote understanding of ETS Appropriately reflect the Crown’s 
responsibilities as a Treaty partner
Minimise fiscal costs/ maximise 
fiscal savings
Support the development of the 
Ma-ori economy consistent with 
their environmental values
Maximise market liquidity
and transparency
Minimise negative/ maximise 
positive wider environmental 
impacts
Facilitate links with other
schemes
Ensure the environmental integrity 
of overseas emission units 
surrendered in the ETS
Source: Ministry for the Environment (2012c)
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discusses	possible	scenarios	for	the	future	
of the New Zealand ETS.
The New Zealand ETS as a tool for 
decarbonisation
Decarbonisation of the New Zealand 
economy is considered challenging. 
Around	 half	 of	 the	 country’s	 gross	
greenhouse	 gas	 emissions	 (excluding	
LULUCF:	 those	 from	 land	 use,	 land-use	
change and forestry) can be attributed 
to	 agriculture.	While	 mitigation	 options	
exist,	the	effectiveness	of	their	application	
varies, as does the estimation of their 
costs	 (see,	 for	 example,	 Cooper,	 Boston	
and	Bright,	2012;	Kerr	and	Zhang,	2009).	
Dependence	on	private	transport	is	high,	
with total emissions from the domestic 
transport	 sector	 making	 up	 about	 20%	
of	 total	gross	emissions	and	projected	to	
continue to increase steadily. Demand for 
car	 transport	 is	 also	 relatively	 inelastic	
to	 fuel	 prices	 due	 to	 the	 country’s	 low	
population	density	and	culture	of	mobility	
and	geographic	isolation	(Ministry	for	the	
Environment	and	Treasury,	2007).	Hence	
emissions reductions in this sector, while 
possible,	are	challenging.
In	 contrast,	 an	 average	 of	 70%	 of	
electricity in New Zealand is generated 
from renewable sources, mostly hydro. 
This already high contribution of 
renewables means that many low-cost 
fuel	 switching	 opportunities	 used	 by	
other	 developed	 countries	 for	 emission	
reductions are not available in New 
Zealand (OECD, 2011). There is still 
scope	 for	 increased	 investment	 in	
renewable energy, and energy efficiency 
is	 attractive	 in	New	Zealand.	Large-scale	
afforestation,	 particularly	 of	 marginal	
and	 erosion-prone	 land,	 as	 well	 as	
avoided deforestation has been argued 
to be one of the most cost-effective 
ways of reducing net emissions, at least 
in the shorter term (Ministry for the 
Environment, 2008).1 It is for this reason 
that	 New	 Zealand’s	 key	 policy	 tool	 for	
reducing emissions, the New Zealand 
ETS, is the first emissions trading scheme 
in the world to include forestry both as 
a source of units for removals and as a 
direct	 point	 of	 obligation	 for	 emissions.	
Setting aside the debate over whether 
afforestation	simply	buys	time	or	in	fact	is	
the first rung on the ladder of transition 
to	a	greener	economy,	a	practical	aim	of	
the ETS has been to drive afforestation 
and deter deforestation. Indeed, it is not 
to industry but to forestry that the vast 
bulk of issuance of emission units has 
been	made	to	date	(EPA,	2014).	
Performance of the New Zealand ETS
The	2011	report	of	the	Emissions	Trading	
Scheme Review Panel found that the ETS 
was	performing	to	expectations,	but	also	
made	 suggestions	 aimed	 at	 improving	
the	 operation	 and	 effectiveness	 of	 the	
scheme to ensure it meets its objectives. 
Broadly	 speaking,	 had	 the	 review	 panel	
recommendations	 been	 adopted	 their	
net effect would have been to increase the 
scope	and	size	of	the	ETS,	relative	to	where	
it stands at the time of writing this article 
(March	 2014).	 The	 panel	 recommended	
that	 ‘transitional	measures’	 –	 specifically	
the	‘two	 for	 one’	 deal	 and	 $25	 price	 cap	
–	 should	 be	 phased	 out	 (albeit	 more	
gradually than originally envisaged). 
The	panel	also	reaffirmed	the	‘all	sectors,	
all	 gases’	 approach,	 and	 said	 that	 it	 was	
appropriate	 that	 agriculture	 was	 to	 be	
included (with free allocation). 
The government’s consultation 
document	 in	April	 2012	 largely	 reflected	
these recommendations, and also 
proposed	 a	 quantitative	 restriction	 on	
the surrender of international units 
(New	 Zealand	 Government,	 2012).	 All	
else held constant, such a restriction 
could	 reasonably	 have	 been	 expected	
to	 provide	 increased	 continuity	 of	
demand	 and	 hence	 greater	 support	 for	
the domestic carbon emissions unit, the 
NZU.	However,	actual	amendments	made	
later that year focused instead on easing 
the burden and cost on households and 
businesses, as well as giving more certainty 
(Ministry for the Environment, 2012a; 
2012c).	 In	 practice,	 the	 amendments	
diverged	 significantly	 from	 the	 panel	
recommendations. Instead of ‘transitional 
measures’	 being	 phased	 out,	 these	 were	
retained	 indefinitely	 and	 applied	 to	 new	
sectors due to enter the scheme in 2013. 
The	 phasing	 out	 of	 ‘free’	 allocations	
to	 the	 industrial	 sector	 was	 postponed	
indefinitely, removing what would have 
been a marginal, but annually increasing, 
pressure	 on	 direct	 industrial	 emitters	
and large energy consumers to achieve 
emissions reductions. Finally, the idea 
of	 implementing	 a	 general	 quantitative	
restriction on the use of United Nations 
offsets	 (i.e.	 ‘supplementarity	 limits’)	
appeared	to	fall	by	the	wayside	and	such	
restriction was not introduced. 
It	is	perhaps	the	failure	to	implement	
this general quantitative limit on offset 
use	which	has	had	the	greatest	impact	on	
the efficacy of the scheme to date. Those 
with obligations remain able to use UN 
offsets	 for	 up	 to	 100%	 of	 surrender	
obligations and this will remain the case 
until	 at	 least	 May	 2015.	 The	 extreme	
reliance	 by	 obligated	 participants	 to	
date	 on	 the	 cheapest,	 and	 in	 some	
cases lowest quality, certified emission 
reductions (CERs), emissions reduction 
units (ERUs) and removal units (RMUs) 
has drawn questions internationally over 
the environmental effectiveness of the 
scheme.	 The	 fact	 that	 the	 concept	 of	
‘supplementarity’2 remains undefined in 
the New Zealand ETS has been the subject 
of criticism (see Mundaca and Richter, 
2013). It should be noted that while a 
series of amendments to render certain 
low-quality offsets3 ineligible were made, 
Critics perceive that the ETS is not working as 
envisaged because the price signal is far too weak 
to incentivise behaviour change and low-carbon 
investments while key emitters are shielded 
from the price and forests are being converted to 
emissions-intensive dairying ... 
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these did not equate to a more general 
quantitative restriction, and in any event 
they were made after many of these units 
were already in the New Zealand registry. 
The result is that the scheme’s ability 
to meet all of the government’s stated 
policy	 objectives	 (as	 outlined	 in	 the	
introduction above) has been stunted. 
The	2011	government	report	on	the	ETS	
(Ministry for the Environment, 2011) 
concluded that the scheme was on course 
to meet the first two objectives, but the 
2011	 review	panel	 also	 concluded	 that	 it	
was	still	too	early	to	discern	the	impact	of	
the	scheme,	particularly	in	relation	to	the	
long-term resilience objective (objective 
three).	The	review	panel	found	that	there	
remained	 a	 need	 for	 a	 clear	 price	 path	
to incentivise low-carbon investments 
in order to deliver the government’s 
third objective (and to continue to work 
towards the first). Indeed, it is hard 
to see how the current scheme could 
be	 supporting	 efforts	 to	 maximise	 the	
long-term resilience of the New Zealand 
economy	at	least	cost,	if	this	is	dependent	
on	 the	 prevailing	 carbon	 price	 and	 the	
level of ambition set by the scheme (two 
determinants highlighted by Ministry 
for the Environment in their regulatory 
impact	statement	regarding	the	proposed	
2012 amendments: see Ministry for the 
Environment,	2012c,	p.22).	
Critics	 perceive	 that	 the	 ETS	 is	 not	
working	 as	 envisaged	 because	 the	 price	
signal is far too weak to incentivise 
behaviour change and low-carbon 
investments, while key emitters are 
shielded	 from	 the	 price	 and	 forests	 are	
being converted to emissions-intensive 
dairying	 (see,	 for	 example,	 Taylor,	 2013;	
many of these arguments were also 
made	 in	 public	 submissions	 in	 the	 2012	
consultations).
With such unfettered access to UN 
offsets, over the course of 2011–13 the large 
surplus	of	international	units,	particularly	
ERUs and RMUs, as evidenced by the 
volume of these units in the New Zealand 
Emission	 Unit	 Register	 (see	 EPA,	 2014)
EPA,	2013;	Ministry	for	the	Environment,	
2012b),	 and	 their	 falling	 prices	 became	
the	dominant	 influence	over	 the	price	of	
the New Zealand unit, which fell from just 
over	 $20	 in	 late	May	 2011	 to	 little	more	
than	$6	 in	 late	May	2012,	 to	 less	 than	$2	
in	late	May	2013.	As	market	events	in	the	
European	 Union	 ETS	 continued	 to	 see	
the	 price	 of	 ERUs	 and	 RMUs	 descend	
to negligible levels, New Zealand units 
appeared	 set	 to	 play	 an	 ever-diminishing	
role	in	the	mix	of	units	surrendered	each	
year by those with obligations under the 
scheme (see Figure 1).
This trend could have continued for 
perhaps	 a	 decade	 had	 the	 2012	 United	
Nations climate change conference not 
had	 significant	 implications	 for	 the	New	
Zealand ETS in this regard. Indeed, that 
the	price	of	a	New	Zealand	unit	continued	
to	 outstrip	 that	 of	 an	 ERU	 (which	 have	
traded into the New Zealand market for 
less	than	15	cents)	can	only	have	been	due	
to	the	possibility	of	further	policy	change	
which would have the effect of increasing 
the	future	carbon	price.	
It was ironic, then, that it was the New 
Zealand government’s own international 
negotiating	 position	 and	 decision	 not	
to take on a second commitment under 
the Kyoto Protocol which delivered this, 
causing the country to lose access to the 
Kyoto	 flexible	 mechanisms	 with	 effect	
from	the	conclusion	of	the	true-up	period	
for	 the	 first	 Kyoto	 commitment	 period.4 
As	 a	 result,	 from	 1	 June	 2015	 Kyoto	
units will no longer be eligible for use in 
the New Zealand ETS and New Zealand 
emitters will no longer have access to the 
cheap	international	offsets	on	which	they	
have	 relied	 almost	 exclusively	 to	 date.	By	
default, then, the New Zealand carbon 
market, historically so highly linked to and 
affected by the market for Kyoto offsets, 
looks set to become cut off. While future 
linking to other markets is, of course, 
possible,	 at	 this	 stage	 only	 units	 of	 New	
Zealand origin will be able to be used for 
compliance	from	1	June	2015	onwards.	
Meanwhile, however, as our survey 
shows,	 the	 extensive	 changes	 to	 the	
domestic ETS design, all in only the first 
four	 years	 of	 the	 policy’s	 existence,	 have	
led to considerable uncertainty among 
stakeholders over the continuing viability 
of	 the	 New	 Zealand	 ETS,	 particularly	
among foresters. Confidence has waned 
among foresters, and indeed the sector is 
set to become a net source of emissions 
rather than a sink by the mid-2020s. 
Not only is afforestation due to the ETS 
not currently indicated, but ongoing 
participation	 from	 the	 sector	 on	 a	
voluntary	basis	appears	to	be	at	risk,	while	
investments from other sectors in low-
carbon technology needed to begin the 
transition to a greener domestic economy 
also	do	not	appear	to	be	happening.	
Figure 1: Breakdown of surrendered units by type
 Source: Ministry for the Environment, 2011, 2012b, 2013b 
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Perceptions of the New Zealand ETS
Our survey highlighted a lack of consensus 
among	participants	on	whether	the	ETS	is	
meeting its objectives. Table 2 shows the 
number	and	categories	of	respondents	to	
the	survey	and	responses	to	the	question	
about	 the	 performance	 of	 the	 ETS	 in	
relation	 to	 its	 objectives.	 It	 is	 important	
to	 note	 that	 several	 of	 the	 respondents	
who agreed that the New Zealand ETS is 
meeting its objectives noted that they were 
considering	 the	 policy’s	 potential	 rather	
than	actual	performance	to	date.
One of the stand-out findings of our 
survey	was	 that	most	 respondents	 either	
disagree or strongly disagree that sufficient 
regulatory	certainty	has	been	provided	by	
the	 government	 to	 date.	 Perhaps	 most	
seriously – for a country whose domestic 
emissions	 reductions	 plan	 appears	 to	 be	
so heavily geared towards afforestation, 
and indeed for a scheme whose domestic 
supply	 potentially	 relies	 heavily	 on	 the	
involvement	 of	 forestry	 –	 of	 the	 85	
foresters surveyed not one believed the 
ETS	 currently	 drives	 any	 new	 planting.	
The	 situation	 is	 particularly	 serious	
given that there are costs associated with 
involvement in the scheme. Indeed, over 
half	 of	 our	 respondents	 either	 disagreed	
or strongly disagreed that the ETS was a 
cost-effective way of reducing emissions, 
while	 16.6%	 responded	 neutrally	 to	 the	
question. 
As	 mentioned	 earlier,	 an	 important	
objective of the ETS is longer-term 
economic resilience, which includes 
transition to a low-carbon economy. There 
is cause for concern about whether this will 
transpire:	 longer-term	 decarbonisation	
will be facilitated by wise investments 
made in the short to mid term. Of the 
foresters	 surveyed,	 37%	 indicated	 that	
the	 long-term	carbon	price	 (e.g.	 to	2020)	
was a decisive factor for them to stay 
in the ETS. Most said that the ETS had 
incentivised	 new	 planting	 in	 the	 past	
(63%),	while	35%	answered	 that	 the	ETS	
had	not	incentivised	new	planting	at	all.	No	
foresters answered that the ETS continues 
to	 incentivise	 new	 planting.	 Of	 those	
capable	 of	 afforestation,	 none	 indicated	
that they would consider doing so below 
$10	per	tonne	of	CO2e	(CO2	equivalent),	
and	the	highest	percentage	of	respondents	
(43%)	 indicated	 that	 they	 would	 only	
consider	planting	 if	 the	price	was	 at	 least	
$15–20.	 (This	 roughly	 corresponds	 with	
the findings in Manley, 2013.) 
Among	emitters,	66%	of	respondents	
said that the ETS has caused no emission 
reductions	 in	 their	 company	 to	 date,	
despite	 the	 initial	 prices	 in	 2010–11	
of	 over	 $20.	 A	 further	 6%	 said	 that	
reductions	were	planned	but	had	not	yet	
eventuated. Of those who could reduce 
emissions, the majority indicated that 
they	 would	 seek	 to	 do	 so	 if	 the	 price	
stayed	 above	 $20	 (24%)	 or	 $25	 (28%).	
This	 fact,	 taken	with	 the	perception	 that	
the ETS no longer drives afforestation, 
would	appear	to	indicate	that	investment	
in a low-carbon economy driven by the 
ETS is at a standstill.
Dealing with uncertainty
The theme emerging from the answers to 
our survey was that of a lack of regulatory 
certainty.	 In	 response	 to	 the	 statement	
‘the	Government	 has	 provided	 sufficient	
regulatory certainty about the NZ ETS’, 
over	80%	of	 the	 total	 respondents	either	
disagreed	 (31.4%)	 or	 strongly	 disagreed	
(50.3%).	 There	 is	 great	 uncertainty	
about whether the ETS will continue 
past	 2020,	 with	 just	 under	 half	 (48%)	
of	 the	 respondents	 confident	 that	 this	
would	 be	 the	 case.	However,	 in	 contrast	
to	Australia’s	carbon	pricing	mechanism,	
the New Zealand ETS’s framework and 
the	 policy	 of	 carbon	 pricing	 at	 least	 has	
support	 from	the	major	political	parties,	
although	bipartisan	support	of	the	design	
remains elusive (though National and 
Labour	nearly	came	to	a	memorandum	of	
understanding on this in its early stages: 
see	 New	 Zealand	 Labour	 and	 National	
Parties, 2007).
The scheme still lacks a sufficient and 
predictable	 price	 signal	 to	 give	 certainty	
about future costs or to incentivise low-
carbon investments. Our survey revealed 
Table 2: 2013 NZ ETS Outlook Survey responses to NZ ETS meeting its objectives
The NZ ETS helps New Zealand reduce its overall emissions
Strongly 
disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree
Total  
Responses
Foresters 26 30% 28 33% 8 9% 21 24% 3 3% 85
Emitters 2 6% 11 34% 9 28% 9 28% 1 3% 32
Traders 3 23% 6 46% 0 0% 4 31% 0 0% 13
Others 8 21% 13 33% 7 18% 9 23% 2 5% 39
Total 39 23.1% 58 34.3% 24 14.2% 43 25.4% 6 3.6% 169
The NZ ETS is a cost-effective way of reducing emissions in New Zealand
Strongly 
disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree
Total  
Responses
Foresters 28 33% 20 23% 11 13% 22 26% 5 6% 85
Emitters 2 6% 8 25% 9 28% 13 41% 0 0% 32
Traders 2 15% 6 46% 0 0% 4 31% 1 3% 13
Others 8 21% 13 33% 8 21% 6 15% 4 10% 39
Total 40 23.7% 47 27.8% 28 16.6% 45 26.6% 10 5.9% 169
The NZ ETS helps New Zealand transition to a greener economy in the future
Strongly 
disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree
Total  
Responses
Foresters 17 20% 29 34% 10 12% 23 27% 7 8% 85
Emitters 4 12% 5 16% 8 25% 15 47% 0 0% 32
Traders 2 15% 6 46% 0 0% 5 38% 0 0% 13
Others 5 13% 11 28% 6 15% 15 38% 2 5% 39
Total 28 16.6% 51 30.2% 24 14.2% 58 34.3% 9 5.3% 169
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that	most	 respondents	would	 ideally	 like	
to	know	the	price	of	carbon	for	the	next	
three	–	five	years	or	longer.	In	proposing	
the 2012 amendments the government 
noted	 that	 ‘participants	 will	 also	 have	
more	certainty	about	the	price	of	carbon	
as	 the	 $25	 price	 cap	 will	 be	 extended’	
(Ministry for the Environment, 2012a). 
The	fixed	price	option	provides	certainty	
about	 the	 highest	 potential	 costs	 faced	
by	 obligated	 participants	 and	 provides	
a safety valve to that end, with the ETS 
essentially	 functioning	 as	 a	 tax	 if	 the	
price	 of	 carbon	 increases	 beyond	 $25.	
In	 fact,	 some	 businesses	 in	 passing	 on	
carbon	 prices	 to	 consumers	 have	 used	
the	$25	price	cap	as	a	proxy	price,	when	
lower-priced	 units	 were	 actually	 being	
used	 for	 compliance	 (evidence	 of	 this	
was	 commented	 on	 by	 the	 review	 panel	
(Emissions Trading Scheme Review Panel, 
2011,	 p.32).	 While	 this	 gives	 certainty	
that the businesses will not undercharge 
consumers (in fact, they are more likely 
to	 profit),	 this	 practice	 has	 already	 lead	
to	 disputes	 (see,	 for	 example,	 Smellie,	
2013).
While there is certainty regarding the 
highest	 costs	 of	 compliance,	 there	 is	 no	
certainty	 of	 any	 such	 price	 to	 underpin	
investments in decarbonisation. The 
range	 of	 $0–25	 is	 a	 wide	margin	 within	
which forestry and other investments 
become viable or not. The deforestation 
intentions survey (Manley, 2013) and our 
own	survey	reveal	that	the	price	of	carbon	
in New Zealand is currently not sufficient 
to deter deforestation or incentivise 
new	 planting.	 In	 line	with	 results	 in	 the	
Manley survey, our survey indicates that 
prices	 over	 $10–15	 are	 probably	 needed	
to	 incentivise	new	planting.	Beyond	new	
planting,	 certainty	 about	 the	 value	 of	
existing	 forestry	NZUs	 is	 also	 a	point	 of	
contention, and the argument behind 
the	 Iwi	 Leadership	 Group	 claim	 against	
the government over the loss in value of 
carbon forestry (see Reuters, 2014).
The	 Iwi	 Leadership	Group	 proposed,	
along	 the	 lines	 of	 the	 price	 cap,	 a	 price	
floor,	which	is	a	potentially	proportionate	
and	 symmetrical	 policy	 response	 to	
help	 address	 this	 issue.	 The	 price	 floor	
mechanism is recognised both in theory 
(see	 Aldy	 and	 Stavins,	 2012;	 Jacoby	 and	
Ellerman,	 2002;	 Philibert,	 2006),	 and	 in	
practice	 with	 the	 auction	 price	 floors	
in	 the	 California	 ETS	 (of	 $US10)	 and	
the	UK	 (at	 £16/tonne)	 (additionally,	 the	
original	 design	 of	 the	Australian	 carbon	
pricing	 mechanism	 included	 an	 $15	
price	 floor).	As	 of	 the	 time	 of	 writing	 a	
floor	 was	 also	 being	 considered	 as	 one	
of	 six	 structural	 changes	 to	 the	 EU	 ETS	
(European	Commission,	2014).	It	may	be	
an	option	to	explore;	although	an	overall	
cap	 designed	 to	 ensure	 that	 supply	 and	
demand	 produces	 a	 consistent	 strong	
price	 signal	 could	 also	 help	 the	 New	
Zealand ETS better meet its third objective 
of incentivising low-carbon investments 
and transitioning the economy (Mundaca 
and Richter, 2013).
It is clear that the ETS is still strongly 
influenced	by	politics,	 and	 this	underlies	
much of the uncertainty and lack of 
ambition	 surrounding	 the	 policy.	 One	
step	 towards	 de-politicising	 the	 ETS	
would	 be	 the	 establishment	 and	 proper	
resourcing	 of	 a	 truly	 independent	
regulatory authority. The establishment 
of the Environmental Protection 
Authority	 (EPA)	 as	 a	 separate	 Crown	
agency	 in	 2011	 put	 the	 ETS	 regulatory	
functions more at arm’s length from 
ministers	 (Smith,	 2010,	 p.3).	 However,	
the	EPA	does	not	advise	on	the	ETS	and	
emission reduction targets in the same 
manner	 as	 independent	 administrative	
bodies	 elsewhere	 (for	 example,	 the	 UK	
Committee on Climate Change or the 
Climate	 Change	 Authority	 in	 Australia;	
even	 the	 European	 Commission	 is	
assuming	more	responsibility	for	the	ETS	
cap,	which	had	formerly	been	the	sum	of	
member	states’	caps).	Nor	does	it	have	the	
potential	 command	 and	 control	 power	
of	 the	 Environmental	 Protection	Agency	
in the United States. The Parliamentary 
Commissioner for the Environment 
has	 an	 independent	 role	 as	 an	 advising	
officer of Parliament and this could be 
a natural home for such an institution. 
However,	 with	 a	 very	 small	 staff	 and	 a	
large	 portfolio	 covering	 wide-ranging	
environmental issues, more resources 
would	be	needed	to	expand	this	role	and	
stronger mechanisms for enhancing its 
authority to make the government more 
accountable	 in	 its	 policy	 targets	 which	
deviate from scientific recommendations 
for seriously addressing climate change. 
Outlook for the New Zealand ETS
New Zealand will meet its Kyoto 
commitments for 2008–12, but largely due 
to forestry offsets (under article 3.3) and 
units	acquired	under	the	Kyoto	flexibility	
mechanisms, rather than by absolute 
reductions in gross domestic emissions, 
which, on the contrary, have continued 
to rise significantly even through the first 
commitment	 period.	Now	 net	 emissions	
(i.e. including emissions and removals 
from domestic forestry) are rising as well, 
as the ETS and other economic factors 
drive deforestation. The latest Ministry 
for	 the	 Environment	 report	 projects	
that	 net	 emissions	 will	 reach	 90	million	
tonnes of CO
2
e by 2040 (Ministry for 
the	 Environment,	 2013c).	 This	 50%	 rise	
in	emissions	(from	1990	levels)	contrasts	
starkly	with	the	government’s	2050	target	
of	a	50%	reduction,	which	would	be	29.9	
million tonnes of emissions. The forest 
sequestration	 that	 has	 been	 helping	 to	
meet short-term commitments will 
instead become a liability as large amounts 
of	 post-1989	 forests	 are	 harvested	 or	
deforested	 as	predicted	 in	 the	 2020s	 and	
onwards (see Bertram and Terry, 2010).  
It	 seems	 apparent	 that	 the	 ETS	 with	
its current settings will cause negligible 
domestic emissions reductions in the 
short term and uncertain investment for 
the longer term. (Even in 2011 the review 
It seems apparent that the ETS with its current 
settings will cause negligible domestic emissions 
reductions in the short term and uncertain 
investment for the longer term.
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panel	noted	that	the	impact	of	the	scheme	
had	 been	 low	 even	 though	 price	 signals	
then had been higher (Emissions Trading 
Scheme	Review	Panel,	2011,	p.17).)	New	
forestry	investments	appear	to	have	been	
committed to on a lagged basis, driven by 
earlier	(higher)	price	signals,	or	indeed	by	
ancillary	drivers	independent	of	the	price	
(e.g.	 log	 prices).	 This	 is	 consistent	 with	
findings from the deforestation survey of 
2012, which showed that ‘the ETS scenario 
leads to higher levels of deforestation 
than	 the	 No	 ETS	 scenario’,	 and	 predicts	
greater deforestation rates in the 2020s 
and continuing conversion of forest land 
to dairy – all likely contributing to a 
significant increase in emissions for New 
Zealand. In fact, that survey even found 
one	 respondent	 intending	 to	 implement	
an accelerated level of deforestation 
under	 the	 ETS	 scenario	 in	 response	 to	
current	 low	 carbon	 price:	 ‘We	 want	 to	
make hay while the sun shines’ (Manley, 
2013,	p.12).	
Our survey indicated a ‘wait and 
see’	 strategy,	 with	 60%	 of	 forestry	
respondents	 currently	 in	 the	 scheme	
indicating that they would remain in the 
ETS	but	did	not	intend	to	trade.	Another	
15%	indicated	they	would	opt	out	of	the	
scheme, with most indicating that they 
would surrender international units for 
their liability and either sell or retain their 
New	Zealand	units.	However,	one	of	 the	
authors of this article is involved directly 
in the market and recent observations 
of market behaviour indicate that this 
number is likely to increase as those 
eligible	 become	 more	 fully	 apprised	 of	
their	options.	
The	 EPA	 has	 already	 recorded	 over	
545	 foresters	 leaving	 the	 scheme,	 almost	
all	 since	 the	 carbon	 price	 fell	 below	 $10	
in mid-2011, and over 400 in 2013. The 
settings	 of	 the	 ETS	 also	 enable	 post-
1989	 forest	 owners	 to	 opt	 their	 land	 in	
and out of the ETS, and this behaviour 
has been observed. This fact, combined 
with the fact that any eligible emissions 
units can be used in order to meet any 
resulting liabilities under the ETS, has 
recently	 presented	 attractive	 arbitrage	
opportunities	 for	 forest	 owners.	 Indeed,	
in	 the	 2013	 calendar	 year	 alone	 over	 92	
million	 Kyoto	 units	 were	 imported	 into	
the New Zealand Emission Unit Register, a 
staggering	number	given	that	compliance	
demand from fossil fuel-related emissions 
remains	 less	 than	 20	million	 tonnes	 per	
annum.	One	possible	cause	of	 the	 influx	
is	that	among	post-1989	forestry	owners,	
the most economically rational course of 
action	 is	now	to	opt	out	of	 the	ETS	and	
surrender RMUs and ERUs back to the 
government. This removes the risk from 
post-1989	 land	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 can	
now be deforested or harvested without 
further future liability (which could be 
difficult to quantify given regulatory 
uncertainty and hence uncertainty about 
the	 future	 price	 of	 carbon).	 In	 essence,	
post-1989	 foresters	 can	 pre-fund	 future	
harvest liabilities at negligible cost today. 
There	is	a	further	upside	in	that	foresters	
who wish to can continue to hold New 
Zealand	units	earned	to	date	in	the	hope	
of	 future	 price	 appreciation.	 Indeed,	
for	 many	 older	 post-1989	 foresters	 ‘de-
risking’	NZUs	in	this	way	puts	them	in	a	
position	to	sell	more	carbon	than	if	they	
stay in the ETS. 
Evidence of the beginning of this trend 
was	also	found	in	the	ETS	annual	report	
for 2011 (Ministry for the Environment, 
2012b):	deforestation	emissions	reported	
were roughly half actual units surrendered 
by forest owners. Numbers were small 
and the trend was relatively recent, with 
the	‘switch’	 point	 at	which	New	Zealand	
units started trading consistently above 
international units occurring around 
July 2011. The allure of using ERUs to 
effectively	 pre-fund	 harvesting	 liabilities	
means surrender of ERUs by forest 
owners may remain a dominant theme 
until	 mid-2015.	 Indeed,	 the	 scale	 of	
issuance	 to	 post-1989	 foresters	 and	 the	
ongoing	availability	of	cheap	ERUs	means	
that	there	is	scope	for	surrender	by	forest	
owners	 to	 outstrip	 surrender	 from	 all	
the other (fossil-fuel emitting) sectors 
combined. 
This situation, combined with the 
market behaviour of emitters buying 
international units, suggests that ERUs 
will	 dominate	 the	 surrender	 mix	 until	
May	2015.	Indeed,	67%	of	emitters	in	our	
survey	 who	 managed	 their	 company’s	
obligations	expected	to	surrender	almost	
entirely	 (over	 90%)	 ERUs	 in	 2014.	 The	
result is that there is a large number 
of New Zealand units that have been 
issued and not used (see Figure 2). While 
international	 units	 already	 purchased	
must	 either	 be	 used	 by	 31	May	 2015	 or	
re-exported,	NZUs	have	no	such	expiry.	
In	 the	 face	 of	 current	 compliance	
demand from the non-forestry sectors 
compared	 to	 issuance	 to	 date,	 there	 is	
the	 potential	 for	 significant	 oversupply	
in the market and thus ongoing low 
carbon	 prices	 even	 after	 May	 2015.	
However,	there	are	reasons	to	believe	that	
this will not be the case. The first is that 
there	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 reluctance	 among	
forestry sellers, who tend to be seasoned 
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long-term	 investors,	 to	 sell	 at	 prices	
lower than what the surveys discussed 
here indicate. Secondly, as the schematic 
in Figure 3 illustrates at a high level, 
there	 are	 a	 number	 of	 different	 political	
and regulatory scenarios that could see 
issuance	 to	date	used	up	 for	 compliance	
much more quickly than under the status 
quo.
Decisions in Doha have already made 
a significant change to the outlook of the 
New Zealand ETS in restricting access 
to international Kyoto units other than 
primary	 CERs.	 However,	 the	 growth	
of liquidity in the NZU market has 
undoubtedly	been	hampered	by	the	lack	of	
supplementarity	limits	to	date.	So,	against	
this	backdrop	of	uncertainty	we	may	also	
see	 further	 policy	 focus	 on	 potentially	
enabling auctioning of units in order to 
‘assure	supply’.	Could	the	market	be	poised	
to undergo redesign by default? If so, this 
will	present	opportunities	to	use	the	design	
of the auction to make other fundamental 
structural	changes.	At	the	moment	there	is	
neither	an	auctioning	design	blueprint	nor	
any	 information	 on	 the	 prerequisite	 cap-
and-carbon	budgeting	process	that	would	
be necessary to ensure the integrity of such 
a	step.	However,	these	design	features	will	
dominate in a closed system and require 
significant consultation to ensure their 
robustness and equity. Figure 3 details 
some	 of	 the	 possible	 scenarios	 for	 the	
New Zealand ETS in balancing interests 
between managing the costs to businesses 
and	 consumers	 by	 having	 price	 controls,	
and managing the ambition to incentivise 
emissions reductions, behaviour change 
and	 longer-term	 investments.	 The	 policy	
choices	 have	 implications	 for	 the	 carbon	
price	(and	thereby	the	costs	to	emitters	or	
the incentives for low-carbon investments), 
as well as the domestic environmental 
performance	 of	 the	 scheme	 in	 response	
to	 this	 price.	 While	 price	 controls	 can	
give more certainty about these costs 
(and	 incentives	 if	 floors	 are	 used),	 the	
overall	 level	of	political	 ambition	 is	more	
determinant	of	the	likely	price.
Legislative	 amendments	made	 by	 the	
current government in late 2012 mean 
that	 auctioning	 could	 be	 implemented	
via regulation. Thus far, the New Zealand 
government	 focus	 appears	 to	 have	 been	
on	ensuring	the	lowest	cost	of	compliance	
to business and households, rather than 
on	 providing	 the	 price	 signals	 necessary	
to drive investment in decarbonisation 
as	 part	 of	 ensuring	 long-term	 economic	
resilience.	To	this	end,	it	is	important	that	
the	implementation	of	auctioning,	if	any,	
is	not	driven	simply	by	the	need	to	ensure	
continuity	 of	 supply	 of	 emissions	 units	
to	 emitters,	 but	 that	 it	 is	 underpinned	
by	 an	 appropriate	 and	 effective	 cap	 on	
domestic	 emissions	 (the	 ‘responsibility’	
target to date cannot be regarded as such 
given	that	use	of	imported	UN	offsets	has	
been unconstrained).  
To	 this	 end	 the	 European	 Union	
ETS can offer lessons. While there were 
mechanisms	implemented	which	provided	
for	relief	of	pressure,	the	removal	of	excess	
supply	 has	 been	 an	 issue	 that	 continues	
to	 prove	 difficult	 for	 the	 European	
Commission to address. The over-
generous	cap	in	the	EU	ETS,	for	example,	
left	 a	 projected	 surplus	 of	 two	 billion	
allowances to remain over the entirety of 
its	 third	 phase	 (until	 2020).	 The	 recently	
approved	 ‘back-loading’	 of	 new	 units	 in	
the	 EU	 ETS	 (effectively	 the	 temporary	
reduction	 in	 previously	 signalled	 auction	
volumes)	is	the	first	step	in	addressing	this	
issue, and longer-term structural reform 
proposals	include	a	‘stability	reserve’	which	
would create automatic adjustments in 
the	 supply	 of	 units	 to	 the	market	 as	well	
as	 adjustment	 of	 the	 EU	 cap	 (European	
Commission, 2014). 
Like	 the	 EU	 ETS,	 the	 New	 Zealand	
ETS will have challenges in addressing 
the	surplus	supply	and	setting	a	cap	that	
achieves credible emission reductions, 
while	 balancing	 predictability	 and	
flexibility.	Given	the	large	volume	of	New	
Zealand units issued but not surrendered 
to	 date,	 the	 strong	 respect	 for	 property	
rights in New Zealand and distaste for 
retrospective	 law	making	and	regulation,	
the	 most	 effective	 mid-term	 fixes	 will	
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Auctioning necessary to support increased 
demand from new targets, rather than to ‘ensure 
supply’. 
Revenue recycled towards complementary 
measures.
Forestry credits / interational offsets potentially 
allowed supporting role to domestic action .
=  significantly higher carbon prices ensuring 
behaviour change and low carbon investments
SECURE SUPPLY NOW
Underlying ambition (5%  on 1990) unchanged.
As above but auctioning introduced imminently 
(i.e. by end 2015) before surplus used and with 
loose cap responding to business concerns about 
security of supply.
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existing pool of forestry NZUs already in registry 
(>110m).
Possible supply of cheaper international offsets 
(non-Kyoto, e.g. by directly linked schemes).
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market
BACK TO THE FUTURE
Rejoin Kyoto and a return to design akin to 2008 
Labour ETS allowing offets.
Could include any/all of the below:
Initially double the size of the market for NZUs by 
removing the 2 for 1 deal;
Potentially remove or increase the price cap of 
$25;
Impose surrender liabilities on agriculture (taking 
compliance demand/surrender to approx 70m 
–free allocations would also increase).
= larger domestic market and international 
offsets for price flexibility
Figure 3: Four possible scenarios for the NZ ETS in the near future
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likely be on the demand side. The most 
obvious would be signalling the removal 
of	 the	 ‘two	 for	 one’	 provision	 and	 the	
reinstatement	 of	 phasing	 down	 the	 rate	
of	free	allocations	where	applicable.	Over	
the longer term, however, auctioning is 
highly likely to be required in order to 
better manage the market and ultimately 
see	emissions	reductions	take	place.
The general election of 2014 has 
significant	 implications	 for	 carbon	
market	 policy.	 The	 Labour	 Party	 has	
previously	 signalled	 that	 it	 would	
continue	 to	 support	 Kyoto.	 While	 this	
may not even be administratively feasible 
in the time scale required, if the country 
were	 to	 rejoin	 then	 presumably	 access	
to	 UN	 offsets	 would	 be	 re-enabled.	 A	
bill	 previously	 introduced	 by	 Labour	
sought	to	require	a	minimum	of	50%	of	
compliance	 obligations	 to	 be	 met	 with	
NZUs. This again creates uncertainty for 
the emitters and landowners alike. 
Conclusion
It is clear that the first years of the New 
Zealand ETS have lacked regulatory 
certainty, an essential ingredient 
for domestic investment that could 
contribute to the decarbonisation and 
hence resilience of the economy. While 
the government has made amendments 
to	the	scheme	with	the	goal	of	providing	
greater certainty, our survey suggests 
that	 significant	uncertainty	persists.	This	
is likely to undermine or delay the low-
carbon investments needed to meet the 
long-term economic resilience objective 
of the scheme. 
The	 extreme	 reliance	 by	 emitters	
to date on international offsets has 
likewise been to the detriment of carbon 
forestry domestic action and has delayed 
investment	 in	 long-term	projects.	 It	 also	
appears	to	have	been	at	odds	with	the	goals	
of international climate commitments. 
Moving forward, there are a number of 
opportunities	 to	 improve	 the	 design	 of	
the	scheme	within	the	existing	 legislative	
and	policy	framework.
1 There are also critics of forestry’s long-term emission 
reduction potential and arguments that there are many cost-
effective abatement opportunities in other sectors (see, for 
example, Bertram and Terry, 2010).
2 The idea of the flexibilities offered by the Kyoto unit trading 
was that they should be supplementary to domestic action. 
Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol, referring to supplementarity, 
reads: ‘The Parties included in Annex B may participate 
in emissions trading for the purposes of fulfilling their 
commitments under Article 3. Any such trading shall be 
supplemental to domestic actions for the purpose of meeting 
quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments 
under that Article’ (UNFCCC, 1992, emphasis added).
3 http://climatechange.govt.nz/emissions-trading-scheme/
building/regulatory-updates/guidance-emission-reduction-
units-certified-emission-reduction-units-ets.pdf.
4 The New Zealand government’s negotiating position was to 
attempt to keep open access to cheaper international Kyoto 
markets without taking a responsibility commitment in Kyoto 
II. It was a gamble to expect continued access to cheap 
Kyoto units for countries unwilling to take on responsibility 
targets for the second commitment period of the Kyoto 
Protocol. The decision at Doha to restrict access was not 
surprising and had been well signalled as a risk given earlier 
threats by developing countries (Reklev and Allan, 2012). 
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